economy. Here it is proved that, assuming that two countries in an open economy share the same risk absolute aversion coefficient and the same information set with some conditions, the portfolio each country holds always attains the same rate of return, regardless of the characteristics of each country's risky asset market, of the proportion in each country's personal asset holdings, of the characteristics of the exchange rate price process, or of the risk free rate in each country. One basic implication of this proposition is that, when two countries share the common information set, each country might be, under these non-general conditions, indifferent, regarding the allocation of home/foreign risky assets, to the diffusion of exchange rate price process. Finally, I discuss another implication of this proposition in the relation with international portfolio diversification and so called "the home bias puzzle".
Price processes
In country 1 there exist one risk-free asset, denoted by fa, and one risky asset, rb, while in country 2 one risk-free asset, fc, and one risky asset, rd, do. Defining the allocation of each asset (fa, rb, fc, rd) for country k (k=1,2) respectively as Estimation and forecast Assume that the price process of a risky asset (denoted by r=rb, rd, say), D ln S r, t { } t ® ¥ is already revealed until time t-1. Then define its past history and the explanatory variable (information set) matrix as following. 
Here, Te (t-1, t-2,…, t-Te) denotes the past periods on which the estimate is based, and 1 -t X is a common explanatory variable matrix for each country, k=1,2. The first column vector of 1 -t X is a summer vector, all elements of which are 1's. For one example, the first row vector
We also define the above matrix and apply them to the following Neoclassical Regression Model.
where Xt is non-stochastic and rank(Xt-1)=J, and I is an identity matrix. 4 The no-arbitrage condition imposes an additional restriction,
We assume that each country, k=1,2, believes that this model applies. However, it does not have to be true. Then, defining Q t -1 º X t -1
can be represented as follows.
The forecast value of the expected rate of return as of time t (ˆ n t ) can be represented as follows.
Expected utility
Each country's expected utility function at time t-1 is a function of the rate of return (ΔlnAk,t), and takes the following form.
where Ak,t is the total asset value of the country k(=1,2) at time t, and
. This utility function possesses a constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion (ak), and is upwardly concave over Ak,t's entire domain (including where Ak,t is negative). Each country holds a portfolio consisting of a risk-free asset and risky assets. The future expected rate of return and variance for each risky asset are estimated based on the past history of explanatory variables, and the portfolio allocation, overall expected rate of return, and overall variance and determined so as to maximize expected utility for the following period.
For example, consider the case in which a country has to determine the allocation ( t z ) of risky assets (r, say) for the next time t (and hence the allocation ( t z -1 ) of the risk-free asset (f, say)) as follows.
Since the (excess) rate of return follows a normal distribution, and we denote the allocation of the risky asset by t z and therefore that of a risk-free asset by t z -1 , then the allocation z t , which maximizes the expected utility for the next time (t), is calculated, as a well-known result, in the following formula. where α is an absolute risk aversion coefficient. Now we claim the following proposition.
Proposition . Assume that the absolute risk aversion coefficients are the same in both countries (α1=α2). Then, the allocation of risky assets (rb in country 1 and rd in country 2) are always the same for both countries for all t. That is:
In addition, the rates of return in the personal asset holdings are always the same for both countries for all t.
for all t Note that these relationships should hold regardless of the values of a r , c r , n b , n d ,
The proof is shown in Section 3.
Method for allocating assets in an open economy
Asset allocation for country 1
For Country 1, three assets (rb, fc, rd) are risky assets.
Defining the above matrix, y 1,b,t -1 , y 1,c,t -1 , y 1,d,t -1 are respectively the histories of the rates of return of three assets (rb, fc, rd) which are observed from country 1.
The expected rate and the variance of return at time t can be estimated as follows. Defining,
, then the variance and the covariance of return at time t can be estimated as:
The expected excess rate of return at time t can be forecast as:
where e T 1 is Te *1 summer column vector, all elements of which are 1's.
The estimated vector and the estimated covariance matrix of the excess return can be constructed as following.
Then the allocation vector of a tangency portfolio which consists of three assets (rb, fc, rd) is to be defined as:
where 3 1 is 3*1 summer column vector, all elements of which are 1's.
The estimated value of the expected excess return of this tangency portfolio is calculated as:
The estimated value of the variance of the excess return of this tangency portfolio is also calculated as:
We also assume that the excess return of this tangency portfolio follows a normal distribution, and denote the allocation by z 1,tan,t and therefore that of a risk-free asset (fa) by 1 -z 1,tan,t . Then the allocation z 1,tan,t , which maximizes the expected utility for the next time (t), is calculated as following.
where α1 is a absolute risk aversion coefficient for country 1.
Let w 1,tan,t (h) denote the h th element of the allocation vector w 1,tan,t (3*1 column vector).
Then,
Asset allocation for country 2
For country 2, three assets (fa, rb, rd) are risky assets. Here, y 2,a,t -1 , y 2,c, t -1 , y 2,d,t -1 are respectively the histories of the rates of return of three assets (fa, rb, rd) which are observed from country 2. Then, the remaining calculation is quite similar as in country 1. Finally, we get: z 2,a,t = z 2,tan, t * w 2, tan,t (1) z 2,b,t = z 2,tan,t * w 2,tan,t (2) z 2,c ,t = 1-z 2, tan,t z 2,d, t = z 2, tan,t * w 2, tan,t (3) (2.11)
Proof of the proposition
In this section, we prove the proposition described in Section 1. The condition we use is just a 1 = a 2 º a . (3.1) The histories of the excess rates of return of three "risky" assets (rb, fc, rd) are observed from country 1 as follows. 
where R 1 is a Te*3 matrix.
Then, from the definition in Section 3, we have: The first, second and third element of the vector z 1,tan, t * w 1,tan,t respectively represent the allocation of each asset (fc, rb, rd). Next, we calculate where 1 1
Here we used the equality, d ZD = , for any arbitrary
Then, 3.11) , and, Similarly, the histories of the excess rates of return of three "risky" assets (fa, rb, rd) are observed from country 2 as follows. Therefore, defining (3.17) Summarizing all the above results, the allocation of all four assets (fa, rb, fc, rd) for country 1 is calculated as follows. 
Some debates-Home bias puzzle in an open economy
The proposition presented in this paper has an interesting economic implication in the sense that it always holds, (1) regardless of the characteristics of each country's risky asset market, including the demand elasticity of market prices, and (2) regardless of the value of the proportion in each country's personal asset holdings (p for country 1 and 1-p for country 2), and (3) regardless of the characteristics of the exchange rate price process (so, whether each country's riskless asset, represented mainly by its currency, is devaluating or revaluating against the other country's), and (4) regardless of the risk free rate in each country (that is, r a = r c º r is not required.), which is supposed to be fixed as a result of each country's monetary policy. Instead, we just need that each country shares the same risk aversion coefficient ( a 1 = a 2 º a ), and the same explanatory variables (the same information set),
This proposition is not a result which can be necessarily derived from conventional general/partial equilibrium theories, but that obtained from a formal coincidence in mathematical formulation combined between the risk-minimizing (risky) portfolio selection and the utility maximizing allocation of risky/riskfree assets under the CARA utility and normality assumptions, as shown in equation ((2.8) and) (3.6). For example, ((2.8) and) (3.6) easily breaks, if we abandon the CARA utility or the normality assumption, therefore, in these cases, the proposition does not hold. Instead, it always holds regardless of the market formation in each country (for example, perfectly/imperfectly competitive, or etc). Also, it always holds even if the underlying economic system is not in equilibrium, because we do where the upper bar denotes the mean over t . This is somewhat counter intuitive, because, for example for country 1, clearly country 2's risky asset (rd) is more "risky" than its own risky asset (rb) because of the exchange rate volatility. But we easily see, in the first equation of (4.2), that all the part of volatility in foreign risky asset rd, attributed to exchange rate process, is completely hedged by holding the same amount of liability in foreign riskfree asset fc. 11 12 Therefore, each symmetric country is, in the long run (in an ergodic sense), perfectly neutral against the exchange rate volatility ( ex s ). The allocation of home/foreign risky assets (rb and rd) itself is not only equated between them, as shown in (4.1), but also each country does really respond to the increase in the volatility of exchange rate process rather by keeping the total portion of home/foreign riskfree assets ( D for country 1), the regression model is made under mis-specification, which necessarily causes a 13 ) ( a c ex r r --¹ n implies that the exchange rate process is in disequilibrium and does not meet no-arbitrage condition. deviated asymmetric distribution of disturbance terms, a smaller risk premium and a larger incentive for holding home country risky asset might be induced for each country than under CARA or a symmetric normal distribution. 16 In other words, in these circumstances the common information sharing might not ensure that the diffusion of exchange rate can be perfectly hedged by adjusting the total amount of home/foreign riskfree assets. One hypothesis, for example, is: under CRRA or upwardly tailed disturbance, the foreign risky asset holding is not neutral regarding the drift of exchange rate processn ex , and the home country asset holding is not neutral regarding the diffusion of exchange rate process s ex .
Therefore, it might be worth doing simulation, which cannot be replaced with analytical work, under a careful specification of the parameter values and nonparametric estimation of distributions and, to examine this hypothesis within the framework of the model. 16 CRRA utility is defined as 
